Maliki vs Sadr

Here’s a link
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/31/world/middleeast/31cnd-iraq.html?hp

to a not completely on it, but still good background piece about the last week’s events in the NYTimes.
Here’s my recap: Maliki ordered the under-motivated Iraqi army into the Basra and when that initially seemed to be going well, also Sadr City. The Mahdi army in both locations- more quickly in Bagdad apparently, mobilized and stopped the Iraqi Army, or more accurately the Iraqi Army stopped fighting once they started encountering serious resistance.
What is astonishing is that the Mahdi army was taken on so audaciously by Maliki, even if they now declare a truce. Accepting a truce would of course be an admission by Maliki that the offensive failed, a failure that will be confirmed if the pipeline payments for the oil passing through Basra continue. Because that is really what this offensive is about.
The article in the NYTimes repeats some talking points put out by the Sadrist political arm that are worth talking about. One of the commonalities between militias the world over- from Sinn Fein to Hamas, Hezbollah to FARC, Somalian ethnic warlords to the Mahdi army, is a public face as a provider of health care and food. What was the fight about in Somalia in ’90-’91? Control of the food distribution network, control that the UN operation was undermining. One of our fights when I was in Bagdad last year was control of the hospital- I eventually helped convince the Iraqi Army brigade to station a platoon at the hospital, something we also did at the Balad hospital when I was there in 2004. We spent a lot of time during my last deployment trying to regain control of kerosene distribution. The Mahdi army doesn’t distribute kerosene and gasoline- the Iraqi government distributes kerosene and gasoline and the Mahdi army hijacks that process.
In contrast, what isn’t astonishing is that the SCIRI Badr corps hasn’t been targeted in this round.
What has to be watched is whether the Mahdi army will still be getting oil pipeline rent payments, and if the Iraqi Army retreats (is "redeployed") from the large sections of Basra that they now hold. Is the truce a defeat of centralization? or a recognition of a new slighter more centralized and Maliki dominated Iraqi reality?